Religious Freedom violation in Moldova
Summer 2015
Republic of Moldova has no state religion although the predominant religion is Orthodox Christianity, a 2007 law on Religious Denominations acknowledges the “special significance and primary role” of the Orthodox Church.All the rest religious organizations must be registered by the state, which can potentially lead to arbitrary and prejudicial decision-making during the registration process. Along with this positive changes to legislation, which has eliminated some of the obstacles religious groups faced with the registration process, religious minorities continue to face discrimination and hostility in Moldovan society.
Religious tolerance and acceptance of religious diversity is another issue Moldovan society faces. The new religious movements are frequently restricted in their rights by the tacit alliance between the State and the Orthodox Church. Although different religions are free to organize their own education, the Orthodox Church monopolizes religious education in secondary schools. The religion lobby also opposed the initiative to introduce Life Skills-Based Education in schools, since it would destroy the traditional family by promoting “abnormal concepts” such as gender and sexual orientation, drugs.
By Constitution all religions are recognized and afforded religious freedoms in Moldova. What is humorous is that by interpretation, these “religions” are referred to as “cults” in Moldova. The explication of cult are the followers of an exclusive system of religious beliefs and practices; followers of an unorthodox, extremist, or false religion or sect who often live outside of conventional society under the direction of a charismatic leader.
There is just one religion which is sanctioned, given special diplomatic status and lots of money. 95-96% of the nation belong to this church, and they claim to be Christian known as the Moldovan Orthodox or Metropolis of Chisinau and all Moldova – part of the Russian Orthodox Church.Priests Rape Children, and the headlines are full of this fact, with more headlines from all around the EU being posted daily. This creepy-looking, long-beard-wearing old Russian is named Vladimir Mikhailovich Gundyayev referred to as Patriarch Kirill I or Cyril I Here is what this cult’s leader says about the Priests who rape children: Nothing! He stands mute and is really good friends with Pope Benedict, youth nazi. So, for him it is all political and money making time all day, every day. So there you have it, he hates Jews but loves pedophiles, but pretends to hate fags. Jews – Prior to WWII there were a lot of Jews in Moldova. However, there are only 12,000 Jews in the former Soviet Republic today – 20 years ago there were 66,000 Jews. Many immigrated to Israel.
In Transnistria, freedom of religion is practically non-existent, in as much as there is an overcomplicated procedure of registration of religious groups, which includes a number of additional requirements. In order to be formally registered, religious groups have to have at least ten members and be active for a minimum of ten years, during which they have limited permission to address the public. Moreover, religious groups can lose their property if they are active without registration. The Transnistria legislation neither complies with international standards, nor guarantees equality for diverse religious groups.
The Baptist community in Transnistria remains unregistered. In the last years, the Baptists in Transnistria complained of increasing harassment from the authorities although the Baptists reported no direct harassment. In addition authorities did not report threats to destroy the group’s church, and the group continued to meet in the same building.
In Transnistria, the authorities do not allow religious groups to participate in elections, other political party activity, or to support nongovernmental organizations involved in elections.
The Moldovan authorities need to seriously consider its international commitments, to fully adopt and start implementing the Freedom of Religion and Belief also respect and fulfill religious freedoms, without discrimination.
Dina
Religious Tensions Reflect Moldova’s Geopolitical Struggles
The intensifying conflict between Moldova’s two Eastern Orthodox churches mirrors the country’s broader geopolitical shift away from Moscow and toward integration with the West. The dominant church, the Metropolitanate of Chisinau and All Moldova, is affiliated with the Moscow Patriarchate and remains influential in pro-Russian regions such as Transnistria and Gagauzia. It supports continued close ties with Russia. In contrast, the smaller Bessarabian Orthodox Church—affiliated with the Romanian Orthodox Church and representing just over 10% of Moldova’s population—advocates for Moldova’s unification with Romania, a position seen as the most radical expression of pro-Western alignment.
While past governments attempted to maintain neutrality between the two churches, recent tensions have made this increasingly untenable. The Bessarabian Church has launched open attacks on the pro-Moscow church, further polarizing the religious and political landscape. Moscow may seek to exploit these divisions to undermine the pro-EU administration of President Maia Sandu.
The West has largely overlooked this issue, perhaps because it does not follow the familiar pattern of Orthodox church independence movements seen elsewhere. Moldova’s unique historical context—including Stalin-era border changes—makes the creation of a national autocephalous church less likely than in Ukraine. Consequently, Chisinau and its Western allies must tread carefully to avoid fueling instability that the Kremlin could exploit.
Tensions with Russia have escalated in recent months. Moldova has expelled Russian diplomats and increasingly discussed the possibility of unification with Romania—a move that would automatically bring Moldova into both the EU and NATO, outcomes Moscow staunchly opposes. In May 2023, President Sandu labeled the pro-Russian Orthodox Church an “agent of Russian influence,” sparking fears within that church of a broader crackdown.
While no official ban has been enacted, the Bessarabian Church escalated the situation by rejecting the legitimacy of the Moscow-affiliated church and inviting clergy and followers to join its ranks. It declared the Chisinau Metropolitanate an “occupation structure of the Moscow Patriarchate,” provoking sharp responses from pro-Russian politicians and religious communities in Gagauzia and Transnistria.
Metropolitan Vladimir (Cantarean), leader of the pro-Russian church, has maintained a cautious stance. According to Russian political analyst Alexey Makarkin, Vladimir is a seasoned figure trying to balance his conservative constituency’s resistance to European influence with the need to avoid provoking a government crackdown. He appears to be banking on his church’s broad support and hoping the government will refrain from radical action.
Makarkin argues that Moldova is unlikely to follow Ukraine’s path toward church autocephaly, as it could politically backfire on Sandu. Instead, a scenario more akin to Estonia—where two Orthodox churches coexist under different jurisdictions—may emerge, although Moldova’s strong Orthodox majority could make such a dual system harder to sustain.
In sum, Moldova’s religious landscape is becoming a new front in its geopolitical reorientation. As Chisinau moves closer to the West, religious divisions—if not carefully managed—could become a tool for Kremlin influence. Western policymakers and allies of Moldova must closely monitor these developments to ensure religious tensions do not derail the country’s democratic and European trajectory.